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Abstract: Contemporary social-scientific research seeks to identify specific causal 
mechanisms for outcomes of theoretical interest. Experiments that randomize populations 
to treatment and control conditions are the “gold standard” for causal inference. We 
identify, describe, and analyze the problem posed by transformative treatments. Such 
treatments radically change treated individuals in a way that creates a mismatch in 
populations, but this mismatch is not empirically detectable at the level of counterfactual 
dependence. In such cases, the identification of causal pathways is underdetermined in a 
previously unrecognized way. Moreover, if the treatment is indeed transformative it 
breaks the inferential structure of the experimental design. Transformative treatments are 
not curiosities or “corner cases”, but are plausible mechanisms in a large class of events 
of theoretical interest, particularly ones where deliberate randomization is impractical and 
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quasi-experimental designs are sought instead. They cast long-running debates about 
treatment and selection effects in a new light, and raise new methodological challenges. 
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An experiment asks the world a question. In social-scientific studies, for instance, researchers 
often want to know whether there is a causal relationship between some event and an outcome of 
theoretical interest. Usually, they will also have a story in mind about the nature of the causal 
mechanism linking the event to the outcome. That is, in addition to inferring that the event 
causes the outcome, researchers often want details of how the event causes the outcome. What is 
the pathway from cause to effect? What is the structure of the causal dependence? How, in detail, 
does the cause bring about the effect? Such questions concern the metaphysical structure of the 
mechanism: the causal relation and its constituents. Does the cause bring about the effect by 
kicking off a chain of events leading directly to the effect? Or does it bring it about via 
preventing other events from happening? Does the cause actively create the effect? Or does it 
work merely by removing roadblocks, thus allowing the effect to occur unimpeded?  
  
The scientific goal is to identify the specific structure of the causal mechanism at work. For 
example, if minorities earn a lower average wage than whites, is it because they tend to be lower-
skilled, or because employers are choosing not to hire qualified minority workers (Pager, 
Western, and Bonikowski 2009)? If married people report higher levels of happiness, does that 
mean marriage makes people happier, or is it that happier people are more likely to get married 
(Stutzer and Frey 2006)? If friends tend to have similar taste in music, is it because people’s 
social networks influence their tastes, or because people with similar tastes tend to become 
friends (Vaisey and Lizardo 2010)? The difficulty of observing and isolating causal mechanisms 
is a core problem for researchers. Experiments are generally seen as the most powerful method 
for identifying them.  
  
Experiments ask their questions by comparing populations that differ systematically only on 
some treatment of theoretical interest. The goal is to identify the causal mechanism based on 
differences in the outcomes observed for each population. An ideal study would compare 
population P1 in world W1 with population P2 in world W2, where these populations and worlds 
are perfect duplicates in all respects until time t1. Then, in world W1, we simply observe the 
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population P1 as it evolves from time t1 to t2. In contrast, in W2, at t1, P2 is “treated,” that is, an 
intervention is performed at t1.1 We then observe the population P2 as it evolves to t2. At t2, we 
compare P2 to P1 and draw inferences based on this comparison. W2 is the “treated” world and 
P2 is the treated population. W1 is the “control” world and P1 is the control population. 
  
Given that the laws and all background conditions in both worlds are the same, and assuming 
determinism for simplicity, any differences in evolution between P2 and P1 can be ascribed to 
the intervention or treatment. This is an application of the idea that we can discover causation by 
uncovering counterfactual dependence. Ceteris paribus, if we can treat the population P2, and 
we can determine that had the treatment not occurred the effect would not have occurred, we can 
infer that the treatment causes the effect (Woodward 2003). 
  
Sometimes, the question at issue is merely a matter of simple counterfactual dependence. Our 
interest, however, is in cases where further information about the mechanism between cause and 
effect is desired. In these cases we want to know the deeper structure of the causal pathway from 
the cause to the effect of theoretical interest. This requires researchers to ask just the right 
question with respect to the theory being tested. Often, the existence of some kind of cause-effect 
relationship and perhaps also the direction of the empirical association will already be 
established by prior work, but there will be substantive disagreement about the nature and 
structure of the causal pathway. If the population-matching process is set up correctly and the 
correct treatment is applied cleanly, this can allow for the accurate measurement of a generic 
cause-and-effect relationship, as well as the identification of the specific causal mechanism at 
work. 
Causal Identification 
  
                                                
1 We are not concerned about reductive accounts of modality here, so we can dispense with 
Lewisian concerns about transition periods, etc. We adopt a version of the approach that ignores 
the need for a transition period. See Woodward (2003), Maudlin (2007), and Paul and Hall 
(2013) for further discussion. 
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Common-or-garden variety causal identification problems arise when we cannot identify the 
dependence or pathway of interest because of some failure of data, or a shortcoming in the 
research design. For example, a survey might find a robust correlation between two variables, 
but be unable to tell us about the direction of counterfactual dependence in that part of the causal 
structure. Or an experiment might reveal that a treatment reliably brings about an effect, but by a 
causal pathway that remains opaque. In either case, the results are consistent with multiple, 
redundant, distinctively different causal stories. Competing causal mechanisms cannot be 
confidently ruled out. 
  
We might be tempted to say that, at least in social science, we could identify causal mechanisms 
by using testimony from the individuals involved. Why not just ask the research subjects how the 
effect of interest was caused, for example with respect to their preferences or their impression of 
the factors perceived as relevant to their decisions? But testimony is not a reliable guide. 
Research on questions about causal mechanisms requiring testimony from subjects is 
complicated not just because different possible pathways could be responsible for the effect, but 
also because some mechanisms may not be socially desirable to report (as in the case of wage 
discrimination), may be subject to rationalization or confirmation bias (as in the case of marital 
happiness), or may be psychologically opaque to the research subject for other reasons. More 
generally, thinking that testimony can be used to straightforwardly identify causal mechanisms 
misunderstands its evidential role. As we emphasized above, the goal is to use the experiment to 
ask the question, and the resulting data to answer it. While subjects’ testimony can be an 
important part of the data gathered and assessed, we cannot identify causal mechanisms of 
interest by simply asking subjects to tell us what they are. It is the world (via the data and 
research design) that must answer this question.2 
  
Some designs allow for more precision in causal identification than others. Conventionally, 
studies can be thought of as being either experimental or observational. The difference depends 
on whether the treatment can be deliberately assigned. In an experiment, a population is selected, 
and the experimenter randomly (but deliberately) assigns population members to a control group 
or an experimental group. Members of the control group are not treated, while members of the 
                                                
2 See our discussion of the fundamental identification problem below for a related point. 
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experimental group are. The treatment is administered to the experimental group, and the effects 
of the treatment are determined by comparison to the control group. The control group functions 
as the counterfactual comparison class for the individuals in the experimental group. 
  
In an observational study, treatments cannot be randomly assigned. In the social scientific cases 
we are focusing on, it is either practically impossible, definitely immoral, or simply illegal to 
randomly assign people to the treatment of interest, such as getting a college degree, having a 
child, or losing a parent before the age of fifteen. Instead, in effect, groups are observed after the 
world “assigns” them to the treatment. Researchers use a variety of identification strategies in an 
effort to make observational studies resemble the experimental ideal as much as possible. For 
example, they may attempt to observe populations that are matched as closely as possible except 
for the variable or quasi-treatment of interest (Stuart 2010), or search for natural experiments that 
can be used to approximate random assignment to a treatment, or construct “instrumental 
variables” to proxy for endogenous explanatory mechanisms (Angrist and Krueger 1990). 
  
The Fundamental Identification Problem 
Even when they are well-designed, both observational and experimental studies are limited by 
the fundamental identification problem (Holland 2006; Rubin 1974, 2005).3 The problem comes 
from the fact that we cannot simultaneously observe the same individual subject in a treated and 
an untreated state. Put another way, we cannot observe the same subject over actual and 
counterfactual states. This problem does not arise from errors in research design or weaknesses 
in data collection. Instead, it stems from constraints on the detectability of facts about individuals 
in empirically inaccessible modal states. We do not have a “modalscope” that lets us observe 
                                                
3 A note on terminology: the sort of identification involved in the fundamental identification 
problem is probably best described as a kind of “mathematical” identification. Some 
identification problems are better described as “mathematical” if, for example, they involve the 
mathematical problem of establishing the values of structural parameters in a model. Other 
identification problems are better described as “causal” if they concern our ability to make an 
inference from the research design and its results about the structure of the causal relations being 
uncovered by the science. Our focus here is on causal identification, but causal identification and 
mathematical identification can be theoretically intertwined when a theory is expressed as a 
structural model of some kind. 
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individuals in non-actual worlds. (And at the level of individuals, we do not have subjects who 
are perfect duplicates, such that the untreated individual can serve as the control for the treated 
individual.) 
  
Observational studies use various clever methods to manage the problem so as to approximate 
the so-called “gold standard” of randomized experiments. But even in the experimental case, 
counterfactual effects cannot be observed at the level of individual subjects. Again, this is 
because our research is restricted to the actual world: 
  
“The researcher wants to compare the outcomes that people would experience if they 
were to receive alternate treatments. However, treatments are mutually exclusive. At 
most, the researcher can observe the outcome that each person experiences under the 
treatment that this person actually receives. The researcher cannot observe the outcomes 
that people would have experienced under other treatments. These other outcomes are 
counterfactual. Hence data on treatments and outcomes cannot by themselves reveal 
treatment effects” (Manski 2003, 15, italics added). 
  
Why is this a problem? Again, one might say, why can’t we just ask individual subjects how they 
would have responded if they had not been treated? Or, for data that does not involve testimony, 
why can’t we just assess the counterfactual properties of untreated individuals by intelligent 
projection, describing the way the world would have evolved forward if there had been no 
intervention, and using this as a basis for assessing the counterfactual? The answer is apparent 
from the last part of Manski’s remarks. The scientist wants the world to tell her the answer to her 
question. If we must determine the counterfactual truths by asking subjects for their post hoc 
assessments, or by relying on a priori judgments about how the world would unfold, or by 
imposing some other theoretical interpretation on the data to establish which counterfactual 
worlds are closest, then data on treatments and outcomes cannot by themselves reveal which 
causal mechanism is at work. 
  
To summarize: the scientist is using the experiment to ask the world a question she does not 
know the answer to. If she must rely on her own theoretical interpretation or the opinionated 
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interpretations of her subjects to supply the answer, her experiment has not done its job. As a 
result, the empirical inaccessibility of counterfactual worlds raises a serious problem, since she 
cannot use empirical methods to make the comparison she needs in order to answer the question. 
(Recall that it is impossible, even in principle, to observe what happens in nonactual worlds.) In 
this way, the fundamental identification problem stems from empirical constraints on our access 
to deep metaphysical facts. 
  
In response, in order to allow the world to provide an answer, scientists change the question. 
Instead of asking a question about an individual, they ask a question about a group. They replace 
the estimation of individual treatment effects with average treatment effects.4 Focusing on the 
counterfactual problem of observing both treated and untreated states, scholars have developed 
sophisticated frameworks to estimate average treatment effects across groups of subjects given 
what we can observe in the actual world (Rubin 2005, Pearl 2009). Researchers attempt to create 
comparison classes for causal inferences using similar populations, such that, despite internal 
heterogeneity at the level of the individual, the populations may be considered to be duplicates 
(with respect to the properties of interest), at the group level. The comparison classes for causal 
inferences use properties of groups rather than properties of individuals and their nonactual, 
duplicate counterparts, and report average effects rather than individual effects.  
 
Our discussion of the fundamental identification problem is intended to draw attention to the 
importance of the idea that empirical data on treatments and outcomes is what reveals treatment 
effects, not post hoc rationalization or a priori speculation. When metaphysical constraints 
prevent data on treatments and outcomes from revealing treatment effects, as they do with the 
fundamental identification problem, methodological revisions and restraint in corresponding 
interpretations are in order. 
  
                                                
4 Because we do not have duplicate individuals in the actual world, we cannot determine 
individual-level treatment effects by assigning one individual to treatment and using her 
duplicate as the control. We randomize to create what for practical purposes are actual-world 
duplicate groups (matched with respect to the properties of interest). The matching is at the level 
of groups, not at the level of individuals. Then we calculate the average outcome for the treated 
actual world group and the average outcome for its untreated, actual world counterpart. The 
difference between these two values is the average treatment effect.  
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So far, our discussion has been uncontroversially within the scope of current thinking on causal 
inference from experimental and observational data. If, however, we shift our attention to a 
related question concerning whether we observe the same subject over time, a new type of 
metaphysical difficulty arises. This new problem stems from empirical constraints on the 
detectability of certain persistence facts about individuals and their preferences across temporal 
and modal contexts.  
Radical preference change 
Becoming a Vampire 
Consider the following thought experiment: 
  
Vampires: In the 21st century, vampires begin to populate North America. Psychologists 
decide to study the implications this could have for the human population. They put out a 
call for undergraduates to participate in a randomized controlled experiment, and recruit a 
local vampire with scientific interests. After securing the necessary permissions,5 they 
randomize and divide their population of undergraduates into a control group and a 
treatment group. At t1, members of each group are given standard psychological 
assessments measuring their preferences about vampires in general and about becoming a 
vampire in particular. Then members of the experimental group are bitten by the lab 
vampire. 
  
Members of both groups are left to go about their daily lives for a period of time. At t2, 
they are assessed. Members of the control population do not report any difference in their 
preferences at t2. All members of the treated population, on the other hand, report living 
richer lives, enjoying rewarding new sensory experiences, and having a new sense of 
meaning at t2. As a result, they now uniformly report very strong pro-vampire 
preferences. (Some members of the treatment group also expressed pro-vampire 
                                                
5 We acknowledge that securing permission from the IRB is perhaps the most fantastical aspect 
of this thought experiment. 
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preferences before the experiment, but these were a distinct minority.) In exit interviews, 
all treated subjects also testify that they have no desire to return to their previous 
condition. 
  
Should our psychologists conclude that being bitten by a vampire somehow satisfies people’s 
underlying, previously unrecognized, preferences to become vampires? No. They should 
conclude that being bitten by a vampire causes you to become a vampire (and thus, to prefer 
being one). Being bitten by a vampire and then being satisfied with the result does not satisfy or 
reveal your underlying preference to be a vampire. Being bitten by a vampire transforms you: it 
changes your preferences in a deep and fundamental way, by replacing your underlying human 
preferences with vampire preferences, no matter what your previous preferences were. In this 
example, the physical nature of the treated subjects is changed in a way that replaces their 
original psychological natures with new ones. 
  
This thought experiment illustrates a case where there is no principled empirical way to 
distinguish between a treatment that causes one’s underlying preferences to be revealed (or, 
alternatively, to be concealed), and a treatment that causes one’s preferences to be replaced. In a 
case like this, there is no principled way to use data on treatments and outcomes to distinguish 
between a causal mechanism that reveals existing preferences (which are then satisfied) and a 
causal mechanism that replaces existing preferences with new preferences (which are then 
satisfied). This raises a causal identification problem: we cannot identify the specific causal 
mechanism at work. It might be objected that we know the subjects have had their preferences 
replaced rather than revealed, because preference replacement is what happens when you get 
bitten by a vampire. But in our thought experiment, the pathway to the changed nature of the 
treated subjects is evident only by construction. We are assuming that we already know the 
physiologically transformative consequences of a vampire bite on people’s psychological 
preferences about vampirism. In general this will not be the case—ordinarily, we are using 
experiments to try to discover this sort of fact. 
  
The source of the problem involves subtle metaphysical assumptions embedded in experimental 
design. An implicit assumption of experimental studies is that the members of the treatment 
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group (and the control group) have stable, persisting selves over time. Colloquially, we assume 
that the members of the treatment group are the same individuals or the same people over time, 
and in particular that they are the same individuals before and after the experiment. That is what 
allows us to infer that there has been an effect on an individual by comparing her testimony at t1 
with her testimony at t2.  
  
In such cases, to detect a meaningful change in a subject, we assume that the individual members 
of the population have stable, persisting selves over time, reflected in the assumption that the 
individuals’ relevant underlying preferences (to be human, to be a vampire) remain stable. Given 
the assumption of stability, we can take ourselves to be discovering the nature of the preferences 
of a subject across a state change by attending to the results of the experiment.  
  
However, in our vampire study, these stability assumptions fail. In this example, the trouble is 
that new preferences, including the relevant underlying preferences, are created by the treatment 
and replace the original preferences. If stability of self is tracked by stability of underlying 
preferences, the treatment (being bitten by a vampire) effectively creates new selves, and so is 
effectively creating a new population after t1. The new population is a population of vampires, 
and vampires have preferences that are very different from those of humans.6 
  
It is obvious that an experiment that physically replaced its treatment population with a new 
group of people at the moment the treatment was applied would be evidentially worthless. 
Imagine, if you like, that the subjects are led into the Treatment Room. Then a research assistant 
enters and quickly pushes them all out a side door, and a new “post-treatment” group is ushered 
in to take their place. In our vampire study, the replacement is also obvious. The original human 
selves have been replaced with vampire selves. 
  
Of course, the individuals participating in our vampire study are changed physically, and may 
even count as new persons. However, the persistence question we wish to attend to concerns 
                                                
6 In metaphysical terms, we might hold that these individuals are strictly personally identical 
over time (their origins are the same, their spatiotemporal trajectory is continuous, and their 
bodily properties are largely the same). However, even if the criteria for personal identity can be 
met, the psychological selves have not persisted. 
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psychological persistence, not personal identity. We use the language of preferences here 
because that is the established terminology, especially in the literature on assessing treatment and 
selection effects in the social sciences. But to be clear, by “underlying preferences” we mean 
what could be thought of as the core elements of one’s character or basic personality traits, etc: 
those aspects that, were they to be replaced, would lead us to say that someone’s identity-
defining values had been replaced. Independently of whether the criteria for personal identity are 
met, in our vampire study, the psychological selves in the experimental population have been 
replaced. And it is the psychological selves, realized by the relevant cluster of underlying 
preferences, that are of experimental interest.7 
  
Vampire treatments are not presently being reported in the social science literature. However, a 
large class of real world events may involve psychological transformations of a relevantly 
similar kind in physically persisting individuals. Our thought experiment highlights the 
assumption that may not hold: that the relevant underlying preferences of individuals under study 
persist through treatment. It is easy to see what justifies this assumption. We have more or less 
the same people, or individuals, at t1 as we have at t2. However, what we cannot assume is that 
this sort of personal continuity ensures the relevant sort of psychological continuity.  
 
Thinking like an Economist 
Next, consider the following case: 
  
Economists: In the late 20th century, economists begin to populate North America. 
Psychologists decide to study the implications this could have for the human population. 
They put out a call for undergraduates to participate in a randomized controlled 
experiment, and recruit a local economics professor with scientific interests. After 
securing the necessary permissions, they randomize and divide their population of 
undergraduates into a control group and a treatment group. At t1, members of each group 
are given standard assessments for selfishness and altruism. Then members of the 
experimental group are taught Introductory Economics by the lab economist. 
                                                
7 See Paul (2014), especially the discussion of finkish preferences in the Afterword 
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Members of both groups are left to go about their daily lives for a specified period of 
time. At t2, they are assessed. Members of the control population do not report any 
difference in their views about selfishness and altruism at t2. A very large number of the 
treated population, on the other hand, report increased levels of selfishness and decreased 
rates of altruism at t2. In exit interviews, many of these subjects say that, in retrospect, 
their pre-treatment lives were filled with irrationality and poorly thought-out decisions, 
and testify that they would never return to their previous condition. (Some members of 
the treatment group also expressed fully pro-selfishness preferences before the 
experiment, but these were a distinct minority.) Some subjects testify that taking the 
course changed the kind of person they are. Others say it helped them see their decision-
making in a new way. 
  
Three things make this case a useful intermediate one for the purposes of our argument. First, 
while vampires are imaginary monsters confined to thought experiments, economists actually 
exist. The case follows a real and intermittently experimental line of research on the possibly 
causal association between studying economics and becoming more selfish (Marwell and Ames 
1981, Carter and Irons 1991, Frank et al. 1993, Bauman and Rose 2011). Second, while the 
treatment is suspected to have strong effects on preferences, it is still within the reach of actual 
randomized controlled trials, unlike some of the more intensive real-life cases that we shall 
discuss below. Observational studies in the literature—i.e., those starting after the point where 
students have chosen their courses of study—cannot rule out the possibility that Economics 
students are simply antecedently more selfish than those who take other courses, and have 
“selected into” the discipline on that basis. But an experimental design can fix this problem. In 
our case, the experimenters can assign students to the treatment and control groups. This 
establishes the required counterfactual dependence, making it possible to calculate the average 
treatment effect on selfishness of taking an Economics class.  
 
Finally, the case also highlights the deeper question about which particular causal pathway is at 
work. Having established a treatment effect of taking a course, we want to know what the 
mechanism is. Some scholars working on this topic argue that taking an economics course is a 
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kind of indoctrination: it replaces the preferences of the students who take it. A warm-hearted 
freshman enters the class and is curdled into a selfish sophomore. An alternative interpretation is 
more pedagogically generous. Taking the class is an educational experience where students are 
given the tools to better understand the rational choices they have always wanted to make. On 
this view, the treatment simply educates students by giving them the means to reveal or express 
their preferences.  
  
Under the first interpretation, the treatment directly creates a preference to be more selfish. 
Under the second interpretation, the treatment reveals an underlying preference to be more 
selfish. According to the latter, let us say, the treatment removes something that is inhibiting or 
preventing the manifestation of the disposition. If a treatment removes the preventer of a 
disposition to be more selfish, we can think of the causal pathway as an instance of what is 
sometimes called “double prevention” (Paul and Hall 2013, 215–231).  
 
The experiment cannot adjudicate between these alternative pathways. Each pathway 
demonstrates the same counterfactual dependence. Under each interpretation, the effect (that the 
individual becomes more selfish), counterfactually depends on the application of the treatment. 
In both interpretations, the treatment is what causes the effect of being more selfish, but in the 
first case the treatment’s effect is brought about directly, while in the second it is brought about 
via double prevention. The pathways are substantively different, but from the experimenter’s 
point of view they are indistinguishable. 
 
Testimony from treated students will not settle the question. Observers might worry that those 
subjects who insist the class helped them become more rational people have in fact been 
indoctrinated or brainwashed. Conversely, we might be skeptical of the students who claim to 
have had their preferences transformed. Perhaps they are now simply a little more educated and 
unwilling to own up to their earlier foolishness.  
 
Can we investigate further, in hopes of experimentally distinguishing between the pathways? We 
could make some progress by very carefully measuring selfishness before and after treatment. 
For example, we might stratify or “block” the experimental design on the basis of pre-test scores 
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on some carefully-calibrated selfishness scale. Subjects who pre-tested as highly selfish would 
then be taken as a subgroup and randomly split into treatment and control conditions. Subjects 
who pre-tested as highly unselfish could be another subgroup, and those in the middle of the 
scale yet another. Random assignments within these subgroups would allow us to calculate more 
fine-grained average treatment effects, conditioning on pre-existing levels of selfishness. This 
would be important if, for example, we thought that taking economics only has an effect on 
students of average selfishness, with already very selfish or very unselfish students unaffected. 
  
Refining our randomization strategy in this or similar ways will further refine our estimate of the 
treatment effect and its scope conditions, but will not adjudicate between the causal pathways of 
interest. An experiment can assign the treatment of taking the course, and this allows us to 
calculate an average treatment effect for it. But to clarify the mechanism, what would be needed 
in addition is some means of “treating on P” at the level of the individual subject, where P is the 
capacity to have one’s preferences drawn out (that is, revealed), versus created or brought into 
existence, as a result of being exposed to the treatment itself. We do not, at present, have any 
means of assigning subjects in this way.  
 
Of course, if we are already committed in advance to one or other of the candidate 
mechanisms—to the view that the treatment reveals preferences, or to the view that it creates 
them—then we will be tempted to take the results as evidence in favor of our preferred pathway. 
A significant treatment effect in the expected direction is certainly better evidence for our theory 
than finding no observed difference between the treatment and the control groups. But the 
competing theories remain underdetermined with respect to the data. Both predict an effect in the 
same direction, just by different causal pathways. The difference between the competing 
pathways is substantively consequential. Our assessment of a classroom where preference 
changes were brought about by ideological replacement would be quite different from one where 
existing views are drawn out or nurtured by the educational process. An individual whom we 
believe to have been indoctrinated would be viewed quite differently from one we believe to be 
better able to express their own views as the result of a good education. 
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The underdetermination in the Economists case illustrates, in a small way, the possibility of a 
much larger and more widespread phenomenon. There is a significant class of ordinary life 
“treatments” of both general and social-scientific interest where persisting individuals may 
undergo psychological transformation such that their psychological selves or relevant underlying 
preferences could be replaced, rather than merely revealed. Such events may include, but are not 
limited to, having a child; participating in intense military combat; suffering massive physical 
trauma; undergoing intense training in medical or law school; or having a sudden religious 
conversion. People who have gone through these experiences often report that their beliefs and 
preferences are radically different now in ways that make their previous lives seem alien to them, 
or that they now have core beliefs or values that their previous selves would have rejected.8 We 
can call interventions that replace preferences in this way transformative treatments.  
Transformative Treatments 
As already noted, in the social sciences most treatments cannot be randomly assigned. Our 
evidence about their effects is almost always observational. Moreover, many of the most 
theoretically interesting questions seem to implicate these sort of unassignable and potentially 
transformative treatments. Social scientists wonder what they would discover if they really could 
randomly assign people to treatments like having a child or being in combat or converting to 
Christianity. For many treatments of interest, random assignment would be a big improvement 
over post hoc controls, instruments, or matching. And so, in practice, researchers spend a lot of 
time trying to make their observational data approximate the experimental ideal. In the past two 
decades, there has been a strong move in the social sciences towards implementing randomized 
controlled trials as widely as possible. The reason for this is clearly stated by Angrist and 
Kreuger (1999): “... the prevailing view is that the best evidence about counterfactuals is 
                                                
8 They may tell us that the transformative event “made them into a new person”. In our terms, 
this should be understood as the claim that their psychological selves have changed, usually 
dramatically. Colloquially, such individuals may describe themselves as “not the same person as 
before”, but this simply reflects the ambiguity between “same self” and “same person” in 
ordinary expressions. At the very least, we do not take them to imply the denial of strict personal 
identity through this change. It’s not as though having a child or going to war implies that you 
need to get a new driver’s license. 
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generated by randomized trials, because randomization ensures that outcomes in the control 
group really do capture the counterfactual for a treatment group.” 
  
Causal identification strategies in the social sciences attempt to empirically find and statistically 
take advantage of exogenous or quasi-exogenous variation on a variable of interest, and make 
that play the role of randomized assignment to treatment and control groups, so that the data can 
more closely or plausibly approximate the standard of a randomized trial. Meanwhile, efforts to 
carry out actual experiments are also very much on the rise. This may tempt us to think that the 
central limitation on social-scientific knowledge is our practical inability to enforce random 
assignment to treatment and control conditions, and that any move closer to the experimental 
standard improves our knowledge of the causal mechanisms we are investigating. However, the 
challenge posed by transformative treatments cannot be dealt with through randomization. This 
is because it arises from the treatments themselves. 
  
With a transformative treatment, the assignment procedure itself creates new (psychological) 
populations. If a treatment creates a new population, a central advantage of randomization is lost. 
That is, we lose the ability to “ensure that outcomes in the control group really do capture the 
counterfactual for a treatment group”. When the new population is created from the experimental 
group after t1, the experimental group is no longer the population that was drawn from the 
original, randomized population constructed for the study. Thus, at t2, the control group drawn 
from the original randomized population can no longer function as an informative counterfactual 
comparison, at least in the intended sense,  to the treatment population at t2. So even if we were 
able to suspend the rule of law and randomize at will, we would not get ideally informative 
experiments. Instead, we would have a machine that creates populations with new preference 
profiles. 
  
Transformative treatments introduce a kind of incoherence into the causal model, a principled 
mismatch of populations, and one that stems from complications involving the metaphysics of 
counterfactual dependence. Recall our discussion of the fundamental identification problem. 
Because we cannot evaluate the treatment effect by measuring the evolution of treated 
individuals against that of their (nonactual) untreated counterparts, we must create a control 
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group using our actual population. So, our starting pool of subjects is randomly divided into a 
treatment group and a control group. Both groups are allowed to evolve forward through time, 
one treated, one untreated, to time t2 for assessment. In effect we are simulating, within the 
actual world, the evolution of an actual treated world (the treatment group) paired with its 
counterfactual untreated world (the control group). Ordinarily, at t2 the treated group is 
compared to its control counterpart in order to assess relevant changes and to determine the 
causal mechanism. And remember: the treatment group and the control group are counterparts at 
the level of groups, so our results must be taken as average effects rather than individual level 
effects. 
  
If a treatment is transformative, at t1, the treatment—in addition to introducing the properties 
whose causal effects we wish to track—causes some core, self-defining preferences of the 
subjects in the treated group to be replaced. The possibility of transformative treatments creates 
two problems. The first is one of underdetermination. The changes we observe in the treated 
group relative to the control group are consistent with more than one causal mechanism—in our 
cases, with one mechanism that reveals a pre-existing preference and with another that creates a 
new preference. But since the problem is introduced by the treatment itself, we cannot refine the 
control group prior to treatment in order to eliminate the underdetermination. The second 
problem that is created lies with the control group. In these cases, if the treatment is indeed 
transformative, by imposing the treatment we effectively destroy our ability to use the control 
group to informatively track relevant changes in the treatment group. The underdetermination 
permits the possibility that the preference has been transformed. And if the preference has been 
transformed, the experimental group no longer matches the control group in the relevant sense. 
  
To restate the second problem: we want to make a comparison between the control group and the 
experimental group at t2, but the randomization is only applied to the experimental group that 
existed at t1, before the treatment. The control group, C, at t1, can function as a counterfactual 
match for the experimental group at t1. But if the treatment is transformative, C is rendered 
ineligible as a control at t2. That is, at t2, C is no longer a counterpart, under the intended 
similarity relation, for the experimental group. (For a different problem of mismatch between 
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causal variable and effect variable, see Halpern and Hitchcock 2010. For related work on how 
changes in the world can require changes in models, see Kummerfeld and Danks 2014.) 
  
Why not eliminate the possibility of underdetermination by just asking individual subjects 
whether their preferences have been revealed or whether they have been replaced? As with the 
fundamental identification problem, we cannot solve the problem this way. Recall the purpose of 
the experimental approach: the scientist wants the world to tell her the answer, and wants to use 
the experiment to provide data on treatments and outcomes that can identify the causal 
mechanism. If we must identify the causal mechanism by asking subjects for their post hoc 
assessments, data on treatments and outcomes cannot by themselves reveal which causal 
mechanism is in play. 
  
This does not mean that we cannot include this sort of testimony as part of a broader assessment 
of our data. Subjects’ testimony about their preferences being changed or tranformatively 
replaced remains informative. It can alert the researcher to the possibility that her control group 
from t1 can no longer function as a control at t2. But this evidence cannot rule out competing 
mechanisms, and so it cannot demonstrate that the change in preferences really is the result of 
transformative replacement. The experiment is what demonstrates the causal pathway. Relying 
on the testimony of the agents is not sufficient to demonstrate the underlying mechanism of 
interest, and so the mechanism remains underdetermined. 
  
The problem with underdetermination is most evident when researchers are interested in 
uncovering mechanisms that participants cannot or will not give reliable testimony about, or in 
getting evidence about something the study population may not tell us directly in a reliable way. 
Consider our opening examples involving disputes over the causal mechanism that underlies 
wage gaps, happiness in marriage, or tastes in friendship. Or consider studies of implicit bias, 
where direct testimony from participants confirming or denying their bias is not necessary or 
even sufficient to identify the causal mechanism at work. 
  
Furthermore, candidate causal mechanisms proposed by these studies typically differ 
substantively in the interpretation they give to the role played by preferences. The implications 
 20 
for interpretation and further intervention will be very different depending on whether a 
treatment is taken to have replaced the relevant preferences of subjects or simply to have 
revealed preferences they had all along. These are not even the only alternatives. Perhaps a post-
treatment change in testimony reflects adaptive preference formation—i.e., subjects have 
reconciled themselves to their new state. Or we might wonder whether subjects even have the 
capacity to recognize that their preferences were so adapted. Possibilities multiply. Could 
subjects be engaging in a massive act of regret-aversion? Or rationalization? Or avoiding 
cognitive dissonance? These questions arise even if subjects testify that their preferences have in 
fact been transformed. In such cases, and in any case that admits of the possibility of 
transformation, we need a principled (empirical) method for determining whether subjects had 
previously unrecognized preferences that were revealed on treatment, are presently engaged in a 
treatment-induced act of rationalization about their new state, or have undergone a treatment that 
was genuinely transformative. 
  
The Vampires example illustrates the conceptual possibility of a treatment that in effect replaces 
the pre-treatment population with a new population. The Economists example showed how even 
fine-grained randomization to treatment and control groups might not distinguish between causal 
pathways of interest when those pathways involve the possibility of preference change that is 
activated by the treatment. Testimony from study participants post hoc, meanwhile, can alert us 
to the possibility that our treatment was transformative, but will not settle the matter. In the  
Economists example, while the scope of the hypothesized replacement of preferences was more 
modest, it was also quite real and in principle within the scope of experimental studies that could 
actually be carried out.  
 
To reiterate: there are two separate problems, and each one carries over to the kinds of cases we 
really care about—for example, those we began with, regarding the effects of childbirth, 
marriage, job discrimination, and so on. In these high-stakes cases, the transformative potential 
of the treatment is prime facie plausible, true random assignment is typically impossible, and the 
second-best solution involves post-treatment methods meant to approximate the experimental 
ideal. In these high-stakes cases, the possibility of underdetermination of the causal mechanism 
opens the door to the problem, and the possibility that the actual causal mechanism is 
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transformative breaks the inferential structure of the quasi-experiment. Thus, empirical work in 
these kinds of high-stakes cases may not in fact be informative about causal processes in the way 
that researchers often take it to be. 
  
Elucidating the conceptual structure of transformative treatments and identifying the possibility 
of underdetermination shows that there is a need for methods that can distinguish, in some 
principled way, between the possibility that preferences are revealed, and the possibility that 
preferences are transformed. Beyond that, even if we could determine that a particular treatment 
was transformative, such a determination remains grist for our mill. If, in the cases of interest, 
treatments are in fact transformative, experimental designs to test the effect of such treatments 
instead create a series of observational studies on distinct populations. Thus, the research design 
is not doing what we took it to be doing. The destructive effect of transformative treatments on 
the inferences we can draw using observational data means that we face a second methodological 
challenge. If transformative treatments exist, new techniques will be needed to study them and 
new interpretations of the data will need to be considered. 
 
Conclusion 
Heckman (2006, 327) remarks that social scientists must grapple with the inconvenient fact that, 
in a non-ideal experimental context, causal inferences require assumptions. One such assumption 
is that relevant preferences of experimental populations are not replaced by experimental 
treatments. We have sought to provide a framework for understanding the causal structure of 
inferences involving treatments where this assumption does not hold.  
Theory in social science is often most in dispute just at the point where individual 
preferences are underdetermined by observational data. Some theories identify preference-driven 
selection processes as the cause behind most outcomes. Others emphasize external pressures or 
social forces. There is also evidence of sour grapes, regret-avoidance, and dissonance reduction 
in post hoc testimony. These disputes are particularly pointed in the case of major events that are 
consequential for people’s lives, from the effects of professional socialization, to induction into 
the Army, incarceration, family formation, migration, and beyond. Unable to deliberately 
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randomize assignment to these treatments, social scientists look for populations that approximate 
this ideal, in order to partially capture the benefits of a true experimental design. 
 
Our argument implies that when treatments are plausibly transformative, the move to quasi-
experimental designs is less informative than commonly thought. Transformative treatments 
“reach into” a subject and significantly change her preference profile at the point of intervention. 
In effect, across all individuals, the transformative treatment creates a new population. The 
immediate difficulty is that the possibility of a transformative treatment allows the data to 
underdetermine the causal pathway. The foundational problem is that if the treatment is indeed 
transformative then it breaks the inferential structure of the experimental design. Both these 
difficulties carry over to the interpretation of the results. Researchers may illegitimately favor the 
revealed preference pathway, and the causal leverage they want will not be available. The 
inferential advantage of quasi-experiments is thus weaker than typically imagined for 
transformative cases, even though this is just where observational researchers now aspire to the 
experimental approach.  
We interpret our conclusion as a methodological challenge. To draw a comparison, recognizing 
the metaphysical inaccessibility of nonactual individual counterparts in the Fundamental 
Identification Problem did not put an end to empirical research involving random assignment to 
treatment and control conditions. Nor did it suspend efforts to learn from data or to find ways to 
approximate individual-level treatment effects. But it did demonstrate the existence of a basic 
metaphysical fact constraining certain sorts of inferences from experimental data, and it 
prompted the development of further methods to generate estimates of average causal effects. 
We should look for similar innovations to face the present problem. 
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